INSURANCE-MARKETS EQUILIBRIUM WITH A NON-CONVEX LABOR SUPPLY DECISION, UNOBSERVABLE EFFORT, AND EFFICIENCY WAGES OF THE “NO-SHIRKING” TYPE

  • Aleksandar VASILEV University of Lincoln, United Kingdom
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14505/tpref.v10.1(19).03

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to describe the lottery and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for (un) employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.

References

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Published
2019-06-30
How to Cite
VASILEV, Aleksandar. INSURANCE-MARKETS EQUILIBRIUM WITH A NON-CONVEX LABOR SUPPLY DECISION, UNOBSERVABLE EFFORT, AND EFFICIENCY WAGES OF THE “NO-SHIRKING” TYPE. Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, [S.l.], v. 10, n. 1, p. 28-34, june 2019. ISSN 2068-7710. Available at: <https://journals.aserspublishing.eu/tpref/article/view/3812>. Date accessed: 23 apr. 2024. doi: https://doi.org/10.14505/tpref.v10.1(19).03.
Citation Formats
Issue
Vol 10 No 1 (2019): TPREF, Volume X, Issue 1(19), Summer 2019
Section
Articles

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