TY - JOUR AU - VASILEV, Aleksandar PY - 2019/06/30 TI - INSURANCE-MARKETS EQUILIBRIUM WITH A NON-CONVEX LABOR SUPPLY DECISION, UNOBSERVABLE EFFORT, AND EFFICIENCY WAGES OF THE “NO-SHIRKING” TYPE JF - Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields; Vol 10 No 1 (2019): TPREF, Volume X, Issue 1(19), Summer 2019DO - 10.14505/tpref.v10.1(19).03 KW - N2 - The purpose of this paper is to describe the lottery and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for (un) employment be put in operation to "complete" the market. UR - https://journals.aserspublishing.eu/tpref/article/view/3812