How Does Altruism Enlarge A Climate Coalition?

Yu-Hsuan LIN

doi:10.14505//jemt.9.3(27).15

Yu-Hsuan LIN Catholic University of Korea, Republic of Korea

DOI: https://doi.org/10.14505//jemt.9.3(27).15

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between individual altruistic attitudes and the incentives of participating in a climate coalition by using a laboratory experiment. A dominant strategy solution design categorizes players into two roles in the game: critical and non-critical players. The critical players have a weakly dominant strategy of joining and are essential to an effective coalition. On the other hand, the non-critical players have a dominant strategy of not-joining. The theory suggests that strong altruism would lead non-critical players to join a coalition. The experimental evidence shows that coalitions could be enlarged from the self-interest prediction. However, the result indicates that the individual incentives for participation seem to be negatively correlated with altruistic attitudes. The stronger the altruistic tendencies the less likely individuals are to join a coalition.

References

Andreoni, J., and Miller, J. 2002. Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica, 70 (2):737-753.
[2] Bahn, O., Breton, M., Sbragia, L., and Zaccour, G. 2009. Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries. International Transactions in Operational Research, 16 (3):307-324.
[3] Barrett, S. 1994. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers: 878-894.
[4] Barrett, S. 2001. International cooperation for sale. European Economic Review, 45 (10):1835-1850.
[5] Bettinger, E., and Slonim, R. 2006. Using experimental economics to measure the effects of a natural educational experiment on altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 90 (8-9):1625-1648.
[6] Blanco, M., Engelmann, D., and Normann, H.T. 2011. A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 72 (2):321-338.
[7] Bratberg, E., Tjøtta, S. and Øines, T. 2005. Do voluntary international environmental agreements work? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50(3): 583-597. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2005.03.002
[8] Breton, M., Sbragia, L., and Zaccour, G. 2010. A dynamic model for international environmental agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics, 45 (1):25-48.
[9] Burger, N.E, and Kolstad, C.D. 2010. International Environmental Agreements: Theory Meets Experimental Evidence 1.
[10] Charness, G., and Rabin, M. 2002. Understanding social preferences with simple tests. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (3):817-869.
[11] d'Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., Gabszewicz, J. J., and Weymark, J. A. 1983. On the stability of collusive price leadership. Canadian Journal of economics:17-25.
[12] Dannenberg, A., Riechmann, T., Sturm, B., and Vogt, C. 2012. Inequality aversion and the house money effect. Experimental Economics, 15 (3):460-484.
[13] Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. M. 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The quarterly journal of economics, 114 (3):817-868.
[14] Finus, M., and Rübbelke, D. T. G. 2013. Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics, 56 (2):211-226. DOI: 10.1007/s10640-012-9570-6
[15] Fischbacher, U. 2007. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental economics, 10 (2):171-178.
[16] Greiner, B. 2004. The online recruitment system orsee 2.0-a guide for the organization of experiments in economics. University of Cologne, Working paper series in economics, 10 (23):63-104.
[17] Grüning, C., and Peters, W. 2010. Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements? Games, 1 (2):137-158.
[18] Hahn, R., and Ritz, R. 2014. Optimal altruism in public good provision. edited by Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1403. Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
[19] Kolstad, C. D. 2014. International environmental agreements among heterogeneous countries with social preferences. National Bureau of Economic Research.
[20] Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., and Riedl, A. 2009. Institution Formation in Public Goods Games. The American Economic Review, 99 (4):1335-1355.
[21] Lin, Y.-H. 2017. The effects of inequality aversion on the formation of climate coalition: Theory and experimental evidence. In Economics of International Environmental Agreements, 73-88. Routledge.
[22] McEvoy, D. M., Cherry, T. L., and Stranlund, J. K. 2014. International environmental agreements with endogenous minimum participation and the role of inequality. In Toward a New Climate Agreement: Conflict, Resolution and Governance, Routledge, edited by Jon Hovi Todd L. Cherry, David M. McEvoy, 93-105. Routledge.
[23] van der Pol, T., Weikard, H.-P., and van Ierland, E. 2012. Can altruism stabilise international climate agreements? Ecological Economics, 81:112-120.
[24] Vogt, C. 2016. Climate Coalition Formation When Players are Heterogeneous and Inequality Averse. Environmental and Resource Economics, 65 (1):33-59.
[25] Willinger, M., and Ziegelmeyer, A. 2001. Strength of the social dilemma in a public goods experiment: an exploration of the error hypothesis. Experimental Economics, 4 (2):131-144.