Board Features and Corporate Performance: A Panel Data Analysis of Moroccan Listed Firms

Abstract

Despite growing interest in corporate governance research, empirical evidence from North African emerging markets remains scarce, and no prior study has applied dynamic panel methods to assess board effectiveness in the Moroccan context using post-2018 data. This study addresses that gap by examining how board characteristics - including size, independence, gender diversity, CEO duality, foreign directors, board committees, and ownership structure - affect the performance of Moroccan listed firms.
Panel data from 44 firms over 2018–2023 are analyzed using Random Effects and System GMM estimators. Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets (ROA) serve as measures of firm performance. Diagnostic tests, including Hansen and Arellano-Bond tests, confirm the robustness of the GMM models.
Board independence, gender diversity, and dispersed ownership are positively associated with performance, while leverage exerts a negative influence. Board size, CEO duality, foreign directors, and committees show no significant impact.
This paper makes three original contributions. First, it provides one of the first dynamic panel analyses of governance-performance linkages in Morocco using System GMM, directly addressing the endogeneity challenge that plagues cross-sectional governance studies. Second, it extends the comparative corporate governance literature to an under-studied North African market with institutional characteristics distinct from both developed and other emerging economies. Third, it generates actionable insights for Moroccan regulators, policymakers, and corporate boards seeking to align with international governance standards and post-COVID restructuring imperatives.

References

Adams, Renée B., & Ferreira, Daniel. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291–309. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.007
Adem, Mohammed, & Dsouza, Preethi Keerthi. (2024). Impact of board characteristics on firm performance: Evidence from Ethiopian microfinance institutions. Global Business Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/09721509241276957
Aguilera, Ruth V., & Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro. (2004). Codes of good governance worldwide: What is the trigger? Organization Studies, 25(3), 415–443. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840604040669
Al-Bassam, Waleed M., Ntim, Collins G., Opong, Kwaku K., & Downs, Yvonne. (2015). Corporate boards and ownership structure as antecedents of corporate governance disclosure in Saudi Arabian public listed corporations. Business & Society, 57(2), 335–377. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650315610611
Al-Hadi, Ahmed, Al-Yahyaee, Khamis Hamed, Hussain, Syed Mujahid, & Taylor, Grantley. (2019). Market risk disclosures and corporate governance structure: Evidence from GCC financial firms. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 73, 136–150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2017.11.008
Amorelli, María-Florencia, & García-Sánchez, Isabel-María. (2019). Critical mass of female directors, human capital, and stakeholder engagement by corporate social reporting. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 27(1), 204–221. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1793
Antari, Oumaima, Sbai, Hicham, & Ed-Dafali, Slimane. (2025). Board gender diversity and ESG performance: Evidence from gender diversity reforms in the MENA region. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting. https://doi.org/10.1108/jfra-11-2024-0781
Arellano, Manuel, & Bover, Olympia. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01642-D
Arellano, Manuel, & Bond, Stephen. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297968
Awa, Hart O., Etim, Willie, & Ogbonda, Enyinda. (2024). Stakeholders, stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility (CSR). International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40991-024-00094-y
Baltagi, Badi H. (2008). Econometric analysis of panel data. Wiley.
Bel-Oms, Inmaculada, Grau-Grau, Alfredo J., & Núñez-Almonte, Janny. (2024). The impact of board gender diversity commitment on firm performance. Business Strategy & Development, 7(4). https://doi.org/10.1002/bsd2.70040
Ben-Amar, Walid, Francoeur, Claude, Hafsi, Taïeb, & Labelle, Réal. (2011). What makes better boards? A closer look at diversity and ownership. British Journal of Management, 24(1), 85–101. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2011.00789.x
Bender, Anne-Françoise, Dang, Rey, & Scotto, Marie-José. (2016). Les profils des femmes membres des conseils d’administration en France. Travail, Genre et Sociétés, 35(1), 67–85. https://doi.org/10.3917/tgs.035.0067
Bernile, Gennaro, Bhagwat, Vineet, & Yonker, Scott. (2018). Board diversity, firm risk, and corporate policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 127(3), 588–612. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.12.009
Blundell, Richard, & Bond, Stephen. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00009-8
Boussaada, Rim, & Karmani, Majdi. (2026). Ownership power, board gender diversity, and CSR performance: Evidence from MENA banks. Business Strategy & Development, 9(2). https://doi.org/10.1002/bsd2.70334
Boyd, Brian K. (1995). CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic Management Journal, 16(4), 301–312. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250160404
Brickley, James A., Coles, Jeffrey L., & Jarrell, Gregg. (1997). Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(3), 189–220. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(96)00013-2
Carter, David A., Simkins, Betty J., & Simpson, W. Gary. (2003). Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. Financial Review, 38(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6288.00034
CGEM. (2008). Code marocain des bonnes pratiques de gouvernance d’entreprise. https://www.cgem.ma/
Chams, Nour, & García-Blandón, Josep. (2019). On the importance of sustainable human resource management. Resources, Conservation & Recycling, 141, 109–122. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.10.006
Chung, Kee H., Wright, Peter, & Kedia, Ben. (2002). Corporate governance and market valuation. Review of Financial Economics, 12(2), 161–172. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1058-3300(02)00063-0
Chung, Kee H., & Pruitt, Stephen W. (1994). A simple approximation of Tobin’s Q. Financial Management, 23(3), 70–74. https://doi.org/10.2307/3665623
Claessens, Stijn, & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey. Emerging Markets Review, 15, 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2012.03.002
Coles, Jeffrey L., Daniel, Naveen, & Naveen, Lalitha. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329–356. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008
Dahya, Jay, Dimitrov, Orlin, & McConnell, John J. (2008). Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(1), 73–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.005
Dalton, Dan R., Daily, Catherine M., Johnson, Jonathan L., & Ellstrand, Alan E. (1999). Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 674–686. https://doi.org/10.2307/256988
Davis, James H., Schoorman, F. David, & Donaldson, Lex. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/259223
Dey, Aiyesha, Engel, Ellen, & Liu, Xiaohui. (2011). CEO and board chair roles: To split or not to split? Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(5), 1595–1618. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.09.001
Dhar, Sanjib Sutra et al. (2026). Gender diversity in corporate governance and sustainable firm performance. Business Strategy & Development, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.1002/bsd2.70314
Donaldson, Lex, & Davis, James H. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 49–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/031289629101600103
Ehikioya, Benjamin I. (2009). Corporate governance structure and firm performance in developing economies: Evidence from Nigeria. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 9(3), 231–243. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700910964307
Eisenberg, Theodore, Sundgren, Stefan, & Wells, Martin T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00003-8
Flannery, Mark J., & Hankins, Kristine Watson. (2013). Estimating dynamic panel models in corporate finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 19(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.09.004
Fama, Eugene F., & Jensen, Michael C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301–325. https://doi.org/10.1086/467037
García Martín, C. José, & Herrero, Begoña. (2019). Do board characteristics affect environmental performance? Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 27(1), 74–94. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1775
García-Ramos, Rebeca, & García-Olalla, Myriam. (2011). Board characteristics and firm performance in family businesses. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2(4), 220–231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2011.09.001
Greene, William H. (2012). Econometric analysis (7th ed.). Pearson.
Guest, Paul M. (2009). The impact of board size on firm performance. European Journal of Finance, 15(4), 385–404. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518470802466121
Gujarati, Damodar N., & Porter, Dawn C. (2009). Basic econometrics (5th ed.). McGraw-Hill.
Harris, Milton, & Raviv, Artur. (1991). The theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance, 46(1), 297–355. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03753.x
Hearn, Bruce. (2013). Determinants of director remuneration in West Africa. Emerging Markets Review, 14, 11–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2012.11.004
Hsiao, Cheng. (2022). Analysis of panel data. Cambridge University Press.
Jensen, Michael C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow. American Economic Review, 76(2), 323–329. https://doi.org/10.2307/1818789
Jensen, Michael C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
Jensen, Michael C., & Meckling, William H. (1976). Theory of the firm. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Jizi, Mohammad. (2017). Board composition and sustainable disclosure. Business Strategy and the Environment, 26(5), 640–655. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.1943
Kalsie, Anjala, & Shrivastav, Shikha Mittal. (2016). Board size and firm performance. Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, 9(2), 148–172. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974686216666456
Kateb, Ines. (2025). Female directors and sustainability performance. Sustainable Development, 33(6), 8969–8983. https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.70138
Klein, April. (1998). Board committee structure and firm performance. Journal of Law and Economics, 41(1), 275–304. https://doi.org/10.1086/467391
Krause, Ryan, Semadeni, Matthew, & Cannella Jr., Albert A. (2013). CEO duality. Journal of Management, 40(1), 256–286. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206313503013
La Porta, Rafael, López-de-Silanes, Florencio, & Shleifer, Andrei. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471–517. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115
Liu, Yu, Miletkov, Mihail K., Wei, Zuobao, & Yang, Tina. (2015). Board independence and firm performance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 223–244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.12.004
Lubatkin, Michael H., Durand, Rodolphe, & Ling, Yan. (2007). Family firm governance theory. Journal of Business Research, 60(10), 1022–1029. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2006.12.019
Mak, Y. T., & Kusnadi, Yuanto. (2005). Board size and firm value. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13(3), 301–318. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2004.09.002
Mangena, Musa, Tauringana, Venancio, & Chamisa, Eddie. (2011). Boards and performance in crisis environments. British Journal of Management, 23(S1). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2011.00804.x
Masulis, Ronald W., Wang, Cong, & Xie, Fei. (2012). Foreign directors and governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53(3), 527–554. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.12.003
Morán-Muñoz, Angel, Fernández-Gago, Roberto, & Godos-Díez, José-Luis. (2024). Board diversity and human rights performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 33(4), 760–781. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12624
Naciri, Ahmed. (2015). Credit rating governance. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315757834
North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678
OECD. (2019). Corporate governance in MENA: Building a framework for competitiveness and growth. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/2a6992c2-en
Oxelheim, Lars, & Randøy, Trond. (2003). Foreign board members and firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(12), 2369–2392. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00395-3
Post, Corinne, & Byron, Kris. (2015). Women on boards and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal, 58(5), 1546–1571. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2013.0319
Roodman, David. (2009). How to do xtabond2. Stata Journal, 9(1), 86–136. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0900900106
Salloum, Charbel et al. (2016). Women and firm performance. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, 27(2/3), 213–231. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJESB.2016.073976
Terjesen, Siri, Couto, Eduardo Barbosa, & Francisco, Paulo Morais. (2015). Board diversity and firm performance. Journal of Management & Governance, 20(3), 447–483. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-014-9307-8
Terjesen, Siri, Sealy, Ruth, & Singh, Val. (2009). Women directors review. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 320–337. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00742.x
Wintoki, M. Babajide, Linck, James S., & Netter, Jeffry M. (2012). Endogeneity in governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), 581–606. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.03.005
Yermack, David. (1996). Board size and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5
Zaman, Mahbub, Hudaib, Mohammed, & Haniffa, Roszaini. (2011). Governance quality and audit fees. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 38(1–2), 165–197. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02224.x
Published
2026-06-30
How to Cite
TAHIRI, Amal; EL ARIF, Fatima Zahra. Board Features and Corporate Performance: A Panel Data Analysis of Moroccan Listed Firms. Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, [S.l.], v. 17, n. 2, p. 528 - 543, june 2026. ISSN 2068-7710. Available at: <https://journals.aserspublishing.eu/tpref/article/view/9523>. Date accessed: 02 july 2026. doi: https://doi.org/10.14505/tpref.v17.2(38).16.