AGGREGATION WITH A NON-CONVEX LABOR SUPPLY DECISION, UNOBSERVABLE EFFORT, AND INCENTIVE (“FAIR”) WAGES

  • Aleksandar VASILEV University of Lincoln, United Kingdom

Abstract

The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of a non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with unobservable e_ort and incentive ("fair") wages a la Danthine and Kurmann (2004), and explicitly perform the aggregation presented there without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations - the derivation of the expected utility functions used for the aggregate household. We show how lotteries as in Rogerson (1988) can be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. With a discrete labor supply decisions, the elasticity of aggregate labor supply becomes a function of effort

References

[1] Danthine, J.-P. and Kurmann, A. 2004. Fair wages in a New Keynesian model of the business cycle, Review of Economic Dynamics, 7: 107-142.
[2] Hansen, G. 1985. Indivisible labor and the business cycle, Journal of Monetary Economics 16: 309-327.
[3] Rogerson, R. 1988. Indivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrium, Journal of Monetary Economics 21: 3-16.
[4] Vasilev, A. 2017. A Real-Business-Cycle model with reciprocity in labor relations and fiscal policy: the case of Bulgaria, Bulgarian Economics Papers 03-2017 (2017), Center for Economic Theories and Policies, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia, Bulgaria.
Published
2019-03-06
How to Cite
VASILEV, Aleksandar. AGGREGATION WITH A NON-CONVEX LABOR SUPPLY DECISION, UNOBSERVABLE EFFORT, AND INCENTIVE (“FAIR”) WAGES. Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields, [S.l.], v. 9, n. 2, p. 144-147, mar. 2019. ISSN 2068-7710. Available at: <https://journals.aserspublishing.eu/tpref/article/view/2760>. Date accessed: 19 may 2019. doi: https://doi.org/10.14505//tpref.v9.2(18).03.