• Daniele SCHILIRÒ Department SEAM, University of Messina, Italy


This contribution focuses on the concept of bounded rationality, highlighting the role of psychology in the economic decisions. The work analyzes Simon’s approach and his notion of bounded rationality as procedural rationality. Moreover, it examines some major contributions of behavioral economics concerning cognitive biases, stressing the importance of the institutional structure in the decision process. The paper also surveys the literature of behavioral finance which has become fashionable in explaining the anomalies of financial markets, pointing out also its limits.


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How to Cite
SCHILIRÒ, Daniele. BOUNDED RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISES. Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields, [S.l.], v. 4, n. 1, p. 97-108, june 2017. ISSN 2068-7710. Available at: <>. Date accessed: 23 jan. 2022.