Modeling of Social Welfare Functions in J. Rawls’s Theory of Justice
Abstract
Public policy is directly related to the formulation of social goals. Social welfare functions can be modeled in two ways: (a) as a derivative of the social status ordering mechanisms applied in public policy; or (b) as norms, which must be further strengthened by solid theoretical foundation. Normative SWF modeling variants, which include Rawls’s theory of justice, are characterized by simplicity and deductive power. This article examines how Rawls’s critique of utilitarianism and intuitionism doctrines allowed changing the axis of political decision-making, reinforcing the priority of the idea of justice. It is also argued that the internal structural logic of this new priority better suits social minorities and that under its banner they are more active and successful in representing their interests in the political arena than the majorities of the same societies.
References
[2] Barry, B. 1973. The Liberal Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press.
[3] Barry, B. 1989. Theories of Justice. University of California Press.
[4] Darwall, S. 1983. Impartial Reason. Cornell University Press.
[5] Darwall, S. 1986. Rational agent, rational act. Philosophical Topics 14(2): 33-57.
[6] Darwall, S., Gibbard, A., and Railton, P. 1992. Toward fin de siecle ethics: some trends in philosophy in review: essays on contemporary philosophy. The Philosophical Review 101(1): 115-189.
[7] Dworkin, R. 1989a. Non-neutral principles. In Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’, ed. N. Daniels, Stanford Series in Philosophy. Stanford University Press:124-141.
[8] Dworkin, R. 1989b. The original position. In Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls ‘A Theory of Justice’. Stanford Series in Philosophy. Stanford University Press:16-52.
[9] Fisk, M. 1989. History and reason in Rawls’ moral theory. In Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls ‘A Theory of Justice’. Stanford Series in Philosophy. Stanford University Press: 53-80.
[10] Foot, Ph. 1988. Utilitarianism and the virtues. In Consequentialism and Its Critics. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford University Press:224-242.
[11] Frankena, W.K. 1963. Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall.
[12] Freiberg, J. 1989. Rawls and intuitionism. In Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Stanford University Press:108-123.
[13] Gauthier, D.P. 1963. Practical reasoning. Clarendon Press.
[14] Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise choices, apt feelings. Harvard University Press.
[15] Hare, R. 1982. Ethical theory and utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press:23-38.
[16] Hare, R.M. 1989. Rawls’ theory of justice. In Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’. Stanford Series in Philosophy. Stanford University Press:81-107.
[17] Hume, D. 1980. Enquiry concerning human understanding. Indianapolis.
[18] Lewine, A. 1974. Rawl’s kantianism. Social Theory and Practice 3(1): 33-49.
[19] Mackie, J. 1984. Ethics: inventing right and wrong. Oxford University Press.
[20] McDowell, J. 1978. Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52: 13-29.
[21] Mill, J.S. 1962. Utilitarianism and Other Essays. Meridian.
[22] Miniotaitė, G. 1985. Socialinio teisingumo teorija. Problemos 33: 92-96.
[23] Moore, G.E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.
[24] Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford University Press/Clarendon.
[25] Nagel, T. 1979. Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
[26] Nagel, T. 1987. The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
[27] Nagel, T. 1989. Rawls on justice. In Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’. Stanford Series in Philosophy. Stanford University Press: 1-15.
[28] Rawls, J. 1958. Justice as fairness. The Philosophical Review67: 164-194.
[29] Rawls, J. 1972. Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press.
[30] Rawls, J. 1980. Kantian constructivism in moral theory: The Dewey lectures.Journal of Philosophy 77(9): 515-577.
[31] Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press.
[32] Scanlon, T.M. 1982. Contractualism and utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press:103-128.
[33] Sen, A. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Harvard University Press.
[34] Sidgwick, H. 1907. The Methods of Ethics. Macmillan and Co.
[35] Voice, P. 2011. Rawls Explained: from Fairness to Utopia. Open Court.
The Copyright Transfer Form to ASERS Publishing (The Publisher)
This form refers to the manuscript, which an author(s) was accepted for publication and was signed by all the authors.
The undersigned Author(s) of the above-mentioned Paper here transfer any and all copyright-rights in and to The Paper to The Publisher. The Author(s) warrants that The Paper is based on their original work and that the undersigned has the power and authority to make and execute this assignment. It is the author's responsibility to obtain written permission to quote material that has been previously published in any form. The Publisher recognizes the retained rights noted below and grants to the above authors and employers for whom the work performed royalty-free permission to reuse their materials below. Authors may reuse all or portions of the above Paper in other works, excepting the publication of the paper in the same form. Authors may reproduce or authorize others to reproduce the above Paper for the Author's personal use or for internal company use, provided that the source and The Publisher copyright notice are mentioned, that the copies are not used in any way that implies The Publisher endorsement of a product or service of an employer, and that the copies are not offered for sale as such. Authors are permitted to grant third party requests for reprinting, republishing or other types of reuse. The Authors may make limited distribution of all or portions of the above Paper prior to publication if they inform The Publisher of the nature and extent of such limited distribution prior there to. Authors retain all proprietary rights in any process, procedure, or article of manufacture described in The Paper. This agreement becomes null and void if and only if the above paper is not accepted and published by The Publisher, or is with drawn by the author(s) before acceptance by the Publisher.