The Experience of the European Union in the Field of Administrative and Legal Support for Asset-Grabbing Prevention
Abstract
The relevance of the study is determined by the necessity to improve criminal and legal antitakeover measures in the current context. The article deals with the comparative analysis of asset-grabbing as a wide-spread phenomenon existing all over the world and mainly typical for the CIS countries. The authors also analyze the experience of the European Union in counteracting illegal takeover of businesses. The analysis has shown that the phenomenon of ‘asset-grabbing’ is absent in the countries with a developed economies. Special state structures should be created to regulate the merger and acquisition transactions in the stock market. The present study is unique as it generalizes a broad legislative experience and shows significant discrepancy between legislation aimed at protecting the interests of shareholders in the countries with developed market economies and in the CIS countries.
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