A Nash equilibrium against gun control
Abstract
This work constructs a non-cooperative, static game of gun control between the citizen and a pacifistic society characterised by law enforcement imperfection, by which the retention of firearms and the certitude of punishment against all crimes emerge both as a strict Nash equilibrium, in pure strategies, and as a strict dominant strategy equilibrium. The reason is that ratified by the Second Amendment to the American Constitution, discerning the necessity of a militia to the individual and societal security of a free state, by which the right of the people to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed.
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