A Nash equilibrium against gun control

Abstract

This work constructs a non-cooperative, static game of gun control between the citizen and a pacifistic society characterised by law enforcement imperfection, by which the retention of firearms and the certitude of punishment against all crimes emerge both as a strict Nash equilibrium, in pure strategies, and as a strict dominant strategy equilibrium. The reason is that ratified by the Second Amendment to the American Constitution, discerning the necessity of a militia to the individual and societal security of a free state, by which the right of the people to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed.

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Published
2024-06-30
How to Cite
SACCAL, Alessandro. A Nash equilibrium against gun control. Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance, [S.l.], v. 10, n. 1, p. 21 - 48, june 2024. ISSN 2458-0813. Available at: <https://journals.aserspublishing.eu/jmef/article/view/8570>. Date accessed: 13 oct. 2024. doi: https://doi.org/10.14505/jmef.v10.1(18).02.