A Multidimensional Coopetitive Duopoly model for a Sustainable Global Economy
1. This paper proposes an interaction model representing a global economy aiming to become environmentally sustainable.
2. The model looks at the production side and consumption side of the economies of two groups of countries.
3. Regarding the production side, the suggested model considers aggregate common/coordinated investments in green technologies against climate change.
4. On the side of consumptions, it considers economic and policy instruments to change the patterns of households’ consumptions, towards products respectful of the planet.
5. The model follows a multi-dimensional game theory approach and applies a theoretical framework à la Cournot.
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