COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME AND DYNAMIC SEQUENTIAL GAME OF ECONOMIC MATURITY

  • Darong DAI Nanjing University
  • Jun YIN Nanjing University

Abstract

In the paper, we are encouraged to investigate the effect of game structure imposed on the minimum-time needed to economic maturity in a dynamic macroeconomic model. Indeed, we have established a basic framework for the comparative study of the cooperative stochastic differential game and dynamic sequential game of economic maturity. Moreover, in a simple stochastic growth model, closed-form solution of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity has been derived with the explicit condition, under which it is confirmed that cooperation between the representative household and the self-interested politician will definitely lead us to much faster economic maturity than that of sequential action, supplied, too. Finally, our model supports the comparative study of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity under different political-institution constraints.

Author Biographies

Darong DAI, Nanjing University

Department of Economics

Jun YIN, Nanjing University

Department of Economics

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Published
2016-10-20
How to Cite
DAI, Darong; YIN, Jun. COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME AND DYNAMIC SEQUENTIAL GAME OF ECONOMIC MATURITY. Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields, [S.l.], v. 4, n. 1, p. 25-60, oct. 2016. ISSN 2068-7710. Available at: <https://journals.aserspublishing.eu/tpref/article/view/289>. Date accessed: 05 july 2022.
Section
Theoretical and Practical Research in the Economic Fields

Keywords

economic maturity, minimum-time objective, political economy, sequential equilibrium, cooperative stochastic differential game